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THE UTILITY OF NON-USE VALUES IN 
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENTS 
Jason J. Czarnezki* 
Adrianne K. Zahner**
Abstract: Non-use values are frequently underestimated or ignored in 
natural resource damage assessments, despite the fact that there are 
signiªcant social and economic beneªts to assessing costs for lost non-use 
values. The regulations of the Department of the Interior, which bind 
some CERCLA trustees, create unusual barriers to the consideration of 
non-use values and are potentially vulnerable to a reasonableness chal-
lenge under Chevron v. NRDC. Trustees who are not bound by the DOI 
regulations should consider calculating and assessing non-use values be-
cause of the economic and social beneªts of recognizing non-economic 
injury caused by the destruction or degradation of natural resources. 
Introduction 
 Maine’s Penobscot River runs 240 miles from Penobscot Lake on 
the Canadian border to Bucksport on the state’s Atlantic coast. The 
river forms the artery of an 8570-square-mile drainage basin, making 
it the second-largest river system in New England.1 The Penobscot 
River Valley has been the home and cultural center of the Penobscot 
Indian Nation for thousands of years,2 and the river has played an in-
                                                                                                                      
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. A.B., J.D., University of 
Chicago. 
** Judicial Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Maine. B.A., Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Amherst; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
The authors wish to thank Michael O’Hear, Katy Rand, Cass Sunstein and Andrea 
Voyer for their most helpful comments. 
1  Maine Rivers, Penobscot Watershed, at http://www.mainerivers.org/penobscot.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2005); Penobscot Partners, Watershed Background & History of the River, 
at http://www.penobscotriver.org/river.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). 
2 Paul Bisulca, Penobscot: A People and Their River, Conservation Matters, Summer 1996, 
available at http://www.penobscotnation.org/articles/bisulca.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); 
Ofªce of the Governor & Council, Penobscot Indian Nation, Statement of Barry Dana, Chief 
of the Penobscot Nation (Oct. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Statement of Barry Dana], at http:// 
www.penobscotriver.org/press_packet/Penobscot%20Nation%20statement.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2005). 
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tegral part in the development of Maine’s economy—from ªshing, 
timber, and hydroelectric power industries to river rafting.3 In part 
because of its role in economic development, however, the Penobscot 
River today suffers from serious pollution problems.4
 Beginning in 1967, a chemical plant in Orrington, Maine, con-
tinuously discharged wastewater containing signiªcant amounts of 
mercury into the Penobscot River and emitted still larger quantities of 
mercury through airborne emissions.5 As a result of this and other 
sources, mercury contamination levels in the lower Penobscot River 
far exceed “safe” levels, and are among the highest in Maine (which 
itself has high rates of mercury contamination compared with other 
states in the nation).6 Because of the unique way mercury interacts 
with its environment, it multiplies in toxicity as it moves up the food 
chain, and it remains in the environment for decades after the release 
of pollutants has ceased.7 The Penobscot River also suffers from con-
taminants other than mercury, such as dioxins8 and tar deposits.9
 Citizens’ use of the river is severely limited by the contamina-
tion.10 The State of Maine Bureau of Health has issued a standing ªsh 
consumption advisory cautioning citizens to limit their consumption 
of ªsh from the lower half of the Penobscot River to one to two meals 
per month.11 Women who are nursing, pregnant, or who may become 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Bisulca, supra note 2; Maine Rivers, supra note 1. 
4 See generally Bisulca, supra note 2 (discussing the nature of the pollution problems aris-
ing from the development of hydroelectric power plants and paper manufacturing mills). 
5 Me. People’s Alliance v. HoltraChem Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D. Me. 
2002). 
6 Id. at 248. 
7 Id. at 244–45, 251. 
8 See Bisulca, supra note 2 (asserting that “dioxin is the most potent carcinogen known 
to man”); Interagency Working Group on Dioxin, Questions and Answers About Dioxins 
(2004) (ªnding that chlorine bleaching of pulp and paper can create dioxins), at http:// 
www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/dioxinqa.html#g1 (last updated Oct. 29, 2004); Natural Res. 
Council of Me., Maine’s Dioxin Problem: The Paper Mill Connection (noting the health hazards 
of dioxins, especially those found in the Penobscot River), at http://www.maineenviron-
ment.org/cfree/dioxin_update.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2005). 
9 See generally City of Bangor v. Citizens Communication Co., No. Civ. 02-183-B-S, 2004 
WL 483201 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2004) (litigating the cleanup costs associated with a tar slide 
in the Penobscot River). 
10 See Me. People’s Alliance, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 253. 
11 Me. Bureau of Health, Warning About Eating Freshwater Fish (Aug. 29, 2000), available 
at http://mainegov-images.informe.org/dhhs/ehu/ªsh/2KFCA.pdf. Inorganic mercury 
becomes methylmercury after interacting with microorganisms in the river’s sediments. See 
Me. People’s Alliance, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 244. Methylmercury affects the development of the 
central nervous system, but also causes damage to fully-developed organisms, including 
humans, such as cardiovascular problems resulting in heart disease and stroke. Id. at 245. 
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pregnant, and children under the age of eight are warned not to eat 
any inland freshwater ªsh because of mercury’s effect on the develop-
ing brain.12 Some individuals refrain from swimming or boating in 
the river because of concerns about the health effects of exposure to 
these pollutants.13
 The contamination causes other losses, too. One citizen has 
testiªed that she felt “robbed” of her right to use the Penobscot River 
and Bay as a result of the mercury contamination.14 The inability to 
fully exercise its ªshing rights in the Penobscot River affects the eco-
nomic well-being of the Penobscot Indian Nation, but it also stresses 
the Nation’s culture and community, centered as they are on the river 
itself.15 Wildlife enthusiasts are harmed as a result of pollution’s de-
structive effects on the reproductive and survival capacities of the 
river’s ºora and fauna.16 These very real but non-economic losses can 
be referred to as non-use values. 
 The term “non-use value” describes the values attributable to the 
simple knowledge that something exists (“existence value”), the po-
tential for its use (“option value”), or the expectation that it will be of 
value to future generations (“bequest value”). 17  Losses may be in-
curred in one or more of these categories of non-use values when a 
natural resource is damaged by pollution.18 In the case of a polluted 
river, preservationists may have lost peace of mind that the natural 
environment was being protected; the loss of a community resource 
or source of pride may have had a detrimental effect on the cohesion 
of the community; and future generations may be prevented from in-
heriting the river’s environmental assets.19 Both use and non-use val-
                                                                                                                      
12 See Envtl. Health Unit., supra note 11. 
13 Me. People’s Alliance, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 253. 
14 Id. 
15 See Bisulca, supra note 2; Statement of Barry Dana, supra note 2 (“We are inextrica-
bly tied to the Penobscot River through a cultural, physical and spiritual relationship that 
runs in our veins as the original inhabitants of this region.”). 
16 See Me. People’s Alliance v. HoltraChem Mfg. Co., No. 00-CV-69, 2001 WL 1704911, 
at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 8, 2001). 
17 See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269, 285–88 
(1989) (deªning and discussing these non-use values (but adopting slightly different for-
mulations, including usage of the term “intertemporal value” in lieu of “bequest value”)); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779, 840 
(1994) (“In particular, people may believe that a species or a pristine area has intrinsic 
rather than instrumental value.”). 
18 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 17, at 289 (hypothesizing as to the loss of existence value 
in the context of hazardous substance release). 
19 See id. at 286–88 (making a similar analogy using the Grand Canyon and endangered 
species). 
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ues are real, yet non-use values are frequently underestimated or ig-
nored in determinations of how much polluters should pay for dam-
ages inºicted upon natural resources.20
 When it passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),21 Congress sought to hold 
polluters liable for the injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources 
resulting from the release of hazardous substances into the environ-
ment.22 Congress and scholars further have recognized that the real 
losses caused by pollution typically exceed lost use or market values,23 
and have expressed skepticism as to “the ability of human beings to 
measure the true ‘value’ of a natural resource.”24 This Article argues 
that consideration of interim non-use values—those non-use values lost 
in the period between the pollution and remediation or recovery of a 
natural resource—is an effective method for CERCLA trustees to ad-
dress these concerns regarding proper valuation and to thereby ad-
vance the public interest. 
 Part I of the Article brieºy describes the relationship between 
CERCLA and various sections of the Department of the Interior regula-
tions. Part II argues that the regulations’ treatment of non-use values is 
subject to challenge for reasonableness under step two of the test de-
veloped in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.25 
Finally, Part III discusses the beneªts of including non-use values in 
natural resource damage assessments and offers some considerations 
for trustees to use in determining the utility of calculating lost interim 
non-use values in a given case. 
                                                                                                                      
20 See id. at 297 (stating that “there is no consensus over the legitimacy of considering 
intrinsic, or even existence, value in measuring natural resource damages”). 
21 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 
(2000)). CERCLA, commonly known as the Superfund law, was amended by the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986). 
22 CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000). 
23 The Ohio v. DOI court held that damages could not be limited to use value only. 
Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court also noted 
that natural resources are not “fungible,” private markets may fail to reºect the value of 
natural resources, and “use value” fails to capture the value of losses incurred as a result of 
pollution. See id. at 456–57 & n.40. For a brief summary of Ohio v. DOI, see Charles B. An-
derson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 417, 441–45 
(1997). 
24 Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 457; see also id. at 457 n.40 (discussing the concerns of schol-
ars). 
25 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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I. The Current DOI Regulations 
A. Overview 
 CERCLA requires the promulgation of damage determination 
procedures to establish the amount of money to be sought in compen-
sation for injuries to natural resources.26 These procedures are com-
monly referred to as natural resource damage assessments (NRDAs), 
and regulations setting forth such procedures have been promulgated 
by the Department of the Interior (DOI). Federal and state agencies 
serve as trustees to oversee the NRDA process described in these regu-
lations.27 However, due to an express regulatory provision declaring the 
procedures “not mandatory,” trustees are not bound to follow them 
unless so required by agency guidance or state law.28 Some trustees use 
the DOI regulations to take advantage of the “rebuttable presumption” 
afforded by the statute, which shifts to potentially responsible parties 
the burden of proof that the trustees’ damage assessment is in error.29 
Other trustees conclude that the beneªt of the presumption is out-
weighed by the difªculty of using the regulations30 or the resulting un-
dervaluation of the losses,31 and calculate damages under CERCLA us-
ing their own guidelines.32
                                                                                                                      
26 CERCLA § 301(c)(1)–(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1)–(2) (2000). 
27 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(rr) (2004) (deªning “trustee” as “any Federal natural resources 
management agency designated in the NCP and any State agency designated by the Gover-
nor of each state” pursuant to pertinent CERCLA provisions). 
28 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2004) (“The assessment procedures set forth in this part are 
not mandatory.”); United States v. Asarco Inc., No. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, 1998 WL 1799392, 
at *2 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 1998) (“According to the applicable regulations, the assessment 
procedures for determining natural resource damages are not mandatory.”). 
29 See CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C) (2000); Ohio v. United 
States Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 439; Asarco, 1998 WL 1799392, at *2; Montauk Oil 
Transp. Corp. v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, 859 F. Supp. 669, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
30 See Robert J. McManus, Why the Ohio Case Shouldn’t Matter, 34 Nat. Resources J. 
109, 109, 110 (1994) (stating that “the entire NRDA process is overly complicated, virtually 
impossible to administer and of uncertain utility” and that the provisions “are so exquisi-
tively complex that their implementation is simply not worth the bother”). 
31 See, e.g., N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement 
Guidance Memorandum (May 17, 1989) (noting the “low dollar value the regulations would assign 
to natural resource damages”), at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/ogc/egm/nrd.html. 
32 For example, one state trustee describes its view as follows: 
 It appears, however, that the limited value of the ‘rebuttable presumption’ 
is outweighed by many disadvantages inherent in the structure of the regula-
tions, especially the low dollar value the regulations would assign to natural 
resource damages. More comprehensively, there are inherent limitations in 
the assessment methodologies, both scientiªc and economic, and signiªcant 
procedural constraints in the regulations. 
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 DOI’s current regulations, 33  promulgated pursuant to section 
301(c)(2)(B) of CERCLA, were adopted following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior, which held invalid a 
regulation limiting recovery to the lesser of restoration cost or lost use 
value of a resource.34 The current regulations set forth two types of pro-
cedures for performing NRDAs: the ªrst involves the use of a standard 
computer model to assess damages that result from chemical or oil dis-
charge in coastal environments (Type A assessment),35 and the second 
provides “alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual 
cases” (Type B assessment).36 “The purpose of the [T]ype B assessment 
is to provide alternative methodologies for conducting natural resource 
damage assessments” in more complex, site-speciªc cases that require 
an individualized approach.37
 The DOI regulations prescribe the procedure for trustees to follow 
at each stage of a case.38 Before initiating a CERCLA action, a trustee 
conducts a “pre-assessment screen” to determine whether there is a rea-
sonable probability that a CERCLA claim would be successful.39 If ap-
propriate, the trustee then develops an “assessment plan” describing 
how the trustee expects to determine the monetary value of the injury 
caused by the pollution,40 and indicates whether it intends to conduct a 
Type A assessment or a Type B assessment.41 A Type B assessment will 
commence if the standard Type A procedures are unavailable, or if the 
                                                                                                                      
 In short, while the Department of Interior’s regulations provide a useful 
starting point and helpful guidance for conducting natural resource damage 
assessments, strict adherence to them in order to gain the value of the ‘rebut-
table presumption’ is unwarranted. 
Id. 
33 The current regulations were promulgated in 1994. They are currently codiªed at 
43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10–.93 (2004). Compare Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 19,752 (proposed April 29, 1991) (to be codiªed at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11), and Natural 
Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (Aug. 1, 1986) (to be codiªed at 43 
C.F.R. pt. 11), with Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (Mar. 25, 
1994) (to be codiªed at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11). 
34 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Unsuccessful procedural and substantive chal-
lenges to the current DOI regulations were made in Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United 
States Department of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
35  EPA, Natural Resource Damage Assessment, at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/pro-
grams/nrd/nrda2.htm (last updated Sep. 23, 2003). 
36 CERCLA § 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (2000). 
37 43 C.F.R. § 11.60(a) (2004); see also EPA, supra note 35. 
38 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10–.93. 
39 See id. §§ 11.23–.25. 
40 See id. §§ 11.30–.32. 
41 See id. §§ 11.34–.36. 
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trustee otherwise elects a Type B assessment over a Type A assess-
ment.42 After completing the assessment, the trustee prepares a report 
describing the assessment and presents a demand to each potentially 
responsible party for its share of the damages,43 ªling suit if appropri-
ate. If the trustee is successful in recovering funds, it develops a plan to 
restore the injured natural resources.44
B. Type B Assessments and Non-Use Values 
 Type B assessments generally consist of three steps: injury de-
termination, injury quantiªcation, and damage determination.45 In 
the damage determination phase, the trustee determines the amount 
of money that will be sought as compensation for injury to natural 
resources.46 For the Type B damage determination phase, the regula-
tions state that 
[t]he measure of damages is the cost of restoration, rehabili-
tation, replacement, and/or acquisition of the equivalent of 
the injured natural resources and the services those re-
sources provide. Damages may also include, at the discretion 
of the authorized ofªcial, the compensable value of all or a 
portion of the services lost to the public for the time period 
from the discharge or release until the attainment of the res-
toration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of 
equivalent of the resources and their services to baseline.47
While the above language seems to focus exclusively on lost use val-
ues, the regulations deªne “compensable value” as follows: 
 Compensable value is the amount of money required to 
compensate the public for the loss in services provided by 
the injured resources between the time of the discharge or 
release and the time the resources and the services those re-
sources provided are fully returned to their baseline condi-
tions. The compensable value includes the value of lost pub-
                                                                                                                      
42 Ofªcials decide between pursuing Type A and Type B procedures pursuant to the 
guidelines in 43 C.F.R. § 11.35. See also id. § 11.36 (describing situations in which both 
Type A and Type B procedures may be used). 
43 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.90–.91 (2004). 
44 See id. §§ 11.91–.93. 
45 Id. § 11.60(b). 
46 See id. § 11.80(b). 
47 Id. (emphasis added). 
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lic use of the services provided by the injured resources, plus 
lost nonuse values such as existence and bequest values. Com-
pensable value is measured by changes in consumer surplus, 
economic rent, and any fees or other payments collect-
able . . . .48
Thus, the deªnition of “compensable value”, and hence the measure of 
damages, appears to include both use value and non-use value.49 Cru-
cially, however, the regulations then proceed to require that “[e]stim-
ation of option and existence values shall be used only if the authorized 
ofªcial determines that no use values can be determined.”50
II. As-Applied Challenges to the Regulations 
A. Challenges to Assessments Relying on the Regulatory Language 
 The inclusion of “nonuse values such as existence and bequest val-
ues” in the deªnition of compensable value, coupled with a require-
ment that “option and existence values” can be used only if no use val-
ues can be determined, places trustees using the regulations in an 
awkward predicament with respect to including non-use values in dam-
age assessments.51 It will be an exceptionally rare case in which a natu-
ral resource has no use value whatsoever—nearly everything has some 
market value. The importance of non-use value is that it recognizes 
non-market based values, which coexist with market values.52 Thus, the 
regulations appear to preclude trustees from considering option and 
existence values in almost every case, leaving only bequest value as a 
non-use value for proper consideration.53 A reasonable rationale for 
this disparate treatment of different types of non-use values is elusive. 
 Based on this simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of certain 
non-use values, the DOI regulations may be susceptible to as-applied 
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. § 11.83(c)(1) (emphases added). 
49 Use value is deªned as “the value of the resources to the public attributable to the 
direct use of the services provided by the natural resources.” 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1)(i). 
Non-use value is deªned as “the difference between compensable value and use value, as 
those terms are used in this section.” Id. § 11.83(c)(1)(ii). 
50 Id. § 11.83(c)(1)(iii) (emphases added). 
51 See id. 
52 See Cross, supra note, 17 at 285–97 (describing different formulations of non-market 
based non-use values). 
53 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (2004) (listing acceptable values and valuation methods 
used in cost estimation of injured or lost natural resources). 
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legal challenges.54 Section 301(c)(2) of CERCLA provides that the 
“regulations . . . shall take into consideration factors including, but 
not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosys-
tem or resource to recover.”55 This language certainly permits the in-
clusion of other factors; indeed it can be argued that section 
301(c)(2)’s “not limited to” language actually requires that the DOI 
regulations include at least one other factor for consideration in mak-
ing NRDAs under the regulations.56 As seen above, DOI has included 
lost non-use values in the regulations as an additional factor for con-
sideration in conducting damage assessments.57
 A federal administrative agency’s regulations may be challenged 
under the standard announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.58 Step one of the Chevron inquiry applies 
where the statutory meaning is unambiguous.59 If a regulation violates 
the plain language of a statute, it will be invalidated under Chevron step 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. 
55 CERCLA § 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (2000). 
56 See id.; 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80–.84 (2004). While “including, but not limited to” language 
is most commonly understood as permissive and not mandatory, it certainly can take on a 
mandatory meaning. Take, for example, the following hypothetical requirement from a 
university policy on the serving of alcoholic beverages: “Foods served shall not be limited 
to salty foods which increase thirst.” In this context, “shall not be limited to” is clearly a 
clause indicating mandatory behavior. Thus, the “including, but not limited to” language 
in section 301(c)(2) could be a combination of two statutory requirements: (a) include 
these enumerated factors and (b) include other factors designed to advance the legislative 
goals of the statute. This construction may make particular sense in light of congressional 
statements of concern for proper valuation of lost natural resources. Whether or not one 
agrees with this analysis of the language of section 301(c)(2), that section clearly permits 
the inclusion of additional factors in the regulations; as such, the inclusion of non-use 
values in the regulations—and subsequent NRDAs—is subject to challenge under Chevron 
step two, as described below. See infra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
57 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1). If section 301(c)(2) is read to require inclusion of an 
additional factor, the necessary additional factor cannot be restoration value, which al-
ready must be considered. See CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (“There shall 
be no double recovery under this chapter for natural resource damages, including the 
costs of damage assessment or restoration, rehabilitation, or acquisition for the same re-
lease and natural resource.”). Under Ohio v. DOI, sections 301 and 107 of CERCLA should 
be read in conjunction when determining what Congress mandated be taken into consid-
eration when measuring damages. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 446–
47 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that one cannot read section 107 while ignoring the existence 
of section 301). Under this construction, “restoration value” is added to the factors for 
consideration enumerated in section 301(c)(2). See id. 
58 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
59 Id. (framing the question as “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue”). 
518 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:509 
one.60 If the statutory meaning is ambiguous, then the regulation is 
evaluated for reasonableness under step two of the Chevron inquiry.61
 Congress’s “but not limited to” language does not unambiguously 
state which additional factor may (or must) be included in the regula-
tion, nor to what extent that additional factor should be considered or 
used in assessing natural resource damages.62 Here, DOI has chosen 
one additional factor to be considered—non-use values—which on its 
face seems sufªcient to satisfy the statutory language of section 
301(c)(2).63 But how should these non-use values be considered, if at 
all? 
 In practice, these regulations are subject to an as-applied reason-
ableness challenge under Chevron step two, based on the perplexing 
treatment of non-use values that permits option and existence values 
to be included in damages only when no use values can be deter-
mined.64 Although the regulations allow for consideration of “nonuse 
values such as existence and bequest values,”65 the end result is that 
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. 
61 Id. at 843. 
62 See CERCLA § 301(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2). Not only does section 301(c)(2) 
not indicate what the additional factor might be, the provision does not indicate whether 
an additional factor must be actually be included in the damage assessment. In other words, 
can the regulation allow a trustee to consider assessing the additional factor—here, non-
use values—and then allow the trustee to decline to include it in the damage measure, or 
does the statute require that the regulation mandate consideration and inclusion of an 
additional factor in NRDAs performed using the regulations? On the one hand, the fact 
that section 107 of CERCLA provides that damages “shall not be limited by” the amounts 
that can be used to restore or replace the resources could mean only that trustees can 
charge more than the amounts necessary to restore or replace the resources, but it does 
not require them to do so. CERCLA and the Ohio v. DOI decision embrace the idea of 
maximizing the discretion of the trustee, and there may be a concern that trustees should 
not recover sums unsubstantiated by evidence. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (2004) (“Damages 
may also include, at the discretion of the authorized ofªcial, the compensable value 
. . . .”); see also CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000); Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d 
at 447–48. On the other hand, Congress, in passing CERCLA, evidenced a concern that 
humans cannot properly evaluate the true worth of natural resources, and would have 
wanted all factors, even if the value is minimal, to be included in the damage assessment. 
See Cross, supra note 17, at 284. 
63 The regulations would probably survive a facial challenge under Chevron step one 
because compensable value includes “nonuse values such as existence and bequest values.” 
43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1). It is only in practice that non-use values will not be considered 
(both in improperly deªning compensable value and by failing to address any non-use 
values once use values are determined). See id. § 11.83(c)(1)(iii). 
64 See id. § 11.83(c)(1)(iii). A ªnding or conclusion by a trustee based on this provi-
sion might also be considered arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, especially if signiªcant non-use values are ignored. See APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 
(2000). 
65 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1). 
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trustees following the regulations will virtually never consider option 
and existence values because some minimal use values will always be 
easily identiªable, and because no other additional factors are indi-
cated in the regulations.66 It seems an unreasonable construction of 
the statute to adopt regulations that welcome entrance of non-use 
values through the front door, in the deªnition of compensable value, 
only to immediately drive them out the back, by allowing estimation 
of non-use values only when use values are completely absent.67
B. Challenges to Assessments Using Incomplete Regulatory Language 
 A separate obstacle to a full recovery for natural resource dam-
ages is that some trustees do not even reach the point of deciding 
whether to consider non-use values, because they fail to recognize the 
complete deªnition of compensable value.68 For example, some trus-
tee assessment plans used by federal administrative agencies and state 
environmental agencies that ostensibly follow the regulations do not 
indicate that non-use values will be considered in the damage deter-
mination phase.69 Rather, these plans deªne “compensable value” for 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Cross, supra note 17, at 284. 
67 The counterargument to this conclusion is equally unreasonable: one could concep-
tualize “option” and “existence” values as different from “bequest” value because option 
and existence values are things I enjoy, while bequest value is something I hope others will 
enjoy. Making this distinction, trustees could consider bequest value under 43 C.F.R. 
§ 11.83(c)(1)(iii), even if use values are determined. Thus, bequest value would be the 
additional factor under CERCLA section 301(c)(2). However, some scholars consider exis-
tence value to be comprised of the subparts option value and bequest value and it is 
difªcult to provide a rationale for why trustees would be allowed to estimate bequest value, 
but not existence or option values. See Cross, supra note 17, at 285–86. 
68 This would not withstand judicial review because the deªnition of compensable 
value would be “plainly erroneous” and “inconsistent” with the regulation’s plain lan-
guage. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (“But the ulti-
mate criterion is the administrative interpretation which becomes of controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”); Albemarle Corp. v. 
Herman, 221 F.3d 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A]s is the case here, the Secretary’s interpre-
tation is not entitled to deference if it is unreasonable or contrary to the regulation’s plain 
language.”) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 
156–57 (1991)). 
69 See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality et al., Stage I Assessment Plan: Kala-
mazoo River Environment Site § 6.1 (Nov. 2000) (“Compensable values for interim 
losses are ‘the value of lost public use of services provided by the injured resources.’”), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/nrda/kalamazoo/report.pdf; U.S. Fish & Wild-
life Serv., Lower Fox River/Green Bay NRDA Initial Restoration and Compensa-
tion Determination Plan § 2.1 (Sep. 14, 1998) (prepared by Hagler Bailly Servs.) 
(“Compensable values include ‘the value of lost public use of the services provided by the 
injured resources.’”), available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/nrda/rcdp.pdf; see also U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior & State of Ind., Assessment Plan for the Natural Resource 
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interim losses as “the value of lost public use of the services provided 
by the injured resources,” deleting the remaining portion of the regu-
latory deªnition, “plus lost nonuse values such as existence and be-
quest values.”70
 While the DOI regulations make consideration and assessment of 
non-use values difªcult, non-use values should not be dismissed out of 
hand at any stage of the NRDA process without a fair look at the po-
tential beneªts of including them in an assessment. 
C. Proposals 
 Trustees that follow the DOI regulations should take notice of in-
terim non-use values to the extent permitted by the regulations.71 DOI, 
for its part, should amend the regulations to allow trustees to include 
lost non-use values in their calculations of damages under CERCLA 
                                                                                                                      
Damage Assessment of the Grand Calumet River, Indiana Harbor Ship Canal, In-
diana Harbor, and Associated Lake Michigan Environments 46–49 (Oct. 1997) 
(prepared by Indus. Econ., Inc.) (ªnding only three areas where compensable value may 
be calculated: interim losses of habitats that provided “important services” to humans; 
interim losses of recreational opportunities; and interim losses representing increased 
costs of past or committed future public development projects), available at http:// 
www.fws.gov/midwest/GrandCalumetRiver/gcraplan.pdf. Contra U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., Lower Fox River/Green Bay Natural Resource Damage Assessment Plan 
§ 9.3.1 (Aug. 1996) (stating that “[c]ompensable values include ‘the value of lost public 
use of the services provided by the injured resources, plus lost nonuse values such as exis-
tence and bequest values’”), available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/nrda/assess.pdf. 
This plan proceeds to embrace the consideration of non-use values at length, ªrst by quot-
ing DOI regulation language and then further by adding its own formulation: 
 Nonuse values (or passive use values) arise from the values individuals place 
on resources apart from their own readily identiªed and measured direct use. 
Nonuse values may include bequest values for the availability of resources for 
use by others now and in the future, and existence values for the protection 
of the resources even if they are never used [56 F.R. 19760]. 
 Additionally, option values to preserve the site for one’s own potential fu-
ture use and casual or indirect uses of natural resources, such as enjoying the 
site while driving or walking by or working near the site; and enjoying hearing 
about, reading about, or seeing photographs of the site may also be included 
in direct uses or passive uses depending on the study design. 
Id. 
70 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) (2004). 
71 See Miriam Montesinos, It May Be Silly, But It’s an Answer: The Need to Accept Contingent 
Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 26 Ecology L.Q. 48, 78 (1999) 
(“Federal courts, DOI and experts have agreed that nonuse values must be included and 
have provided for nonuse values to be part of NRD assessments.”). However, state natural 
resource damage laws may expressly prohibit the use and recovery of non-use values. See, 
e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.20104(2)–(3) (2003). 
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regardless of whether any lost use values can be determined,72 particu-
larly in light of the otherwise very conservative calculation procedures 
set forth in the regulations, which often result in severe underestima-
tions of the cost of remediation.73
III. The Utility of Non-Use Values 
 As explained in the introduction, non-use value includes existence, 
option, and bequest value.74 Existence value is the worth to people of 
knowing that a given natural resource is protected; option value is the 
value to people of retaining the option for future use; and bequest 
value comes from knowing that a natural resource will be available to 
future generations.75 The literature on these non-use values abounds 
with discussion of the difªculty of calculating non-use values. But many 
of these articles lose sight of an administrative reality: CERCLA trustees, 
whose role it is to assess resource damages and pursue claims for recov-
ery, have the autonomy to decide how, or even whether, to charge pol-
luters for lost non-use values. 
A. Measuring Non-Use Values 
 Because non-use values are inherently non-economic, perhaps the 
most common method of calculating such values involves asking indi-
viduals what dollar ªgure they would assign to a particular resource.76 
This type of study is termed a contingent valuation (CV) study. The Ohio 
v. DOI court upheld DOI’s continued use of CV as a “best available pro-
cedure” in determining resource values under CERCLA. 77  The CV 
process “set[s] up hypothetical markets to elicit . . . [the] economic 
valuation of a natural resource,” and is used when there are no adequate 
models of market behavior available to measure use or non-use values.78 
                                                                                                                      
72 Such amendment should not be problematic; the regulation must be reviewed and re-
vised as appropriate every two years. CERCLA § 301(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(3) (2000). 
73 See N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 31. 
74 Cross, supra note 17, at 285–86. 
75 Id. at 285–86. 
76 See id. at 315, 320 n.267 (citing Alan Randall, Total Economic Value as a Basis for Policy, 
116 Transactions Am. Fisheries Soc’y 325, 329 (1987) (declaring that contingent valua-
tion “offers the only means of directly estimating the total value of nonmarketed environ-
mental assets”)). 
77 Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 423, 478 (1989). However, reliance on 
CV studies may expose a NRDA to further as-applied challenges under Chevron step two. 
78 See id. at 475. Adequate models of market behavior that could be useful in measur-
ing non-use values are contributions to charitable organizations, calculations of donated 
time, and the like, which indicate the economic resources some humans are willing to 
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Speciªcally, “CV involves a series of interviews with individuals for the 
purpose of ascertaining the values they respectively attach to particular 
changes in particular resources.”79 While some have expressed criticism 
that CV studies can result in overestimation of damages and speculative 
or egregious outcomes,80 the Ohio v. DOI court made clear its unwilling-
ness to judicially overrule “DOI’s careful estimate of the caliber and 
worth of CV methodology.”81
 Contingent valuation studies do have several important substantive 
weaknesses, which have been discussed in detail by numerous scholars. 
Highly susceptible to bias, overestimation of how much money people 
would spend to preserve a resource, question sequence effects, “pair” 
effects, and insensitivity to quantity, CV can result in implausibly high 
valuations.82 There are procedural difªculties as well. For example, the 
applicable facts may change during preparation of a CV study, forcing 
the trustee to choose between proceeding with the development of an 
                                                                                                                      
expend on non-economic beneªts. This market-based analysis may provide more predict-
able results than a CV study, but will probably also result in dramatic undervaluation of 
non-use value due to the transaction costs and injection of other issues into the valuation 
question. However, because of their conservative nature, market indicators of non-use 
value may provide trustees with strong, and cheaply obtained, data on non-use value for 
inclusion in NRDAs. 
79 Id. For a short critique of CV techniques, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 76–83 (1995) (discussing whether CV 
or other alternatives are adequate surrogates for willingness to pay). 
80 See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 475–76; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Coherent and Incoherent 
Valuation: A Problem with Contingent Valuation of Cultural Amenities 1 (Feb. 2002) (prelimi-
nary draft Sep. 25, 2001) (arguing that the problem with contingent valuation is category-
bound thinking: “[w]hen people explore particular problems in isolation, they normalize 
them by comparing them to a cognitively accessible comparison set, consisting of cases 
from the same basic category”), at http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/workingpapers/ 
Sunstein12.pdf. 
81 880 F.2d at 478. 
82 See James Peck, Comment, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigat-
ing Natural Resources Damages, 14 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 275, 284 (1999) (“Critics of the 
method argue that the method is hypothetical and generates unreliable damage estimates, 
produces results that cannot be independently validated, determines value from persons 
lacking sufªcient information to be estimating value, and is not consistent with principles 
of valuation that are basic to the economics profession.”) (citations omitted); Note, “Ask a 
Silly Question . . .”: Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 
1981, 1984–89 (1992) (discussing the unreliability of contingent valuation for non-use 
values). See generally Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some 
Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 45 (1994); Daniel Kahneman & Ilana 
Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Model, 
9 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (1994). 
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outdated study, or beginning the study once the facts are fully devel-
oped but risking critical delay in obtaining the results.83
 Because it is so difªcult to calculate non-use values, it should not be 
surprising that many trustees are reluctant to incorporate lost non-use 
values into natural resource damage assessments.84 Another factor that 
may discourage trustees from considering non-use values is that natural 
resources historically have been deªned in terms of use. Nevertheless, a 
strictly use-based approach does not sufªciently capture nature’s full 
value.85 “The fundamental problem of damage valuation for the per se 
loss of wildlife is that the intrinsic worth of natural resources does not 
conveniently ªt the terms of economic accountability.”86 Including non-
use values in NRDAs strikes a balance between the purely economic view 
of the value of natural resources and more controversial notions such as 
assessing damages for animal suffering caused by pollution.87
                                                                                                                      
83 See Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource 
Damages, 32 Envtl. L. 57, 85 (2002). 
Therefore, trustees could face an unappealing choice, either proceed with 
the development of an original CVM study and face the possibility that new 
information will make the expensive study irrelevant, or choose to wait until 
the facts are more fully developed. However, requirements for speedy trials 
combined with the lengthy process of developing an original CVM study . . . 
could mean that the results would not be available in time for trial. 
Id. 
84 See id. 
85 Many view their freedom from environmental risk and the protection of pristine ar-
eas not as a function of use, “but for their beauty or their independence from human 
artiªce,” and “[t]he emphasis in law on ‘use value’ inadequately captures the way they 
value the relevant goods.” Sunstein, supra note 17, at 839. “In environmental law, the major 
issue of contestation is frequently the appropriate kind of valuation of environmental 
amenities; if beaches, species, and mountains were valued solely for their use, we would 
not be able to understand them in the way that we now do.” Id. at 860; see also Gregory G. 
Garre, Environmental Law: CERCLA, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations under Chevron, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 932, 
940 (1990) (“The diminution in use value standard for calculating natural resource dam-
ages is criticized on the ground that ‘it ignores the reality that natural resources may have 
worth beyond their use by humans’ and thus undervalues natural resource damages.” (ci-
tations omitted)). 
86 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 189 (3d ed. 2004); see also Cross, supra note 17, at 270 (“Placing an economic 
value on natural resources is not just an academic exercise.”). 
87 But perhaps expanding the notion of non-use value is appropriate. See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 394 (2003) (stating that balancing 
human versus animal interests must depend on values—“on how much weight we should 
assign to the relevant interests,” and suggesting at the very least that “suffering and harms to 
animals should count”); J. Baird Callicott, Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental 
Ethics, 21 Am. Phil. Q. 299, 300 (1984) (stating that nature must have some value even when 
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B. The Beneªts of Assessing Damages for Lost Non-Use Values 
 Assessing damages for lost non-use values can bestow many 
beneªts upon communities affected by pollution. The additional 
funds procured can be used as a “reserve” fund in the (very likely) 
event that the actual cost of restoration or replacement exceeds the 
amount calculated and received from the perpetrator for remedia-
tion.88 Moreover, assessing additional liability for injury to special re-
sources will require potential polluters to exercise extra caution with 
assets that are important to the public, and will help protect such re-
sources. Finally, the assessment of damages for lost non-use values 
recognizes the loss of a resource that may be central to the identity of 
a community and the insult caused by a polluter who failed to exer-
cise due care for the communities it affected.89
 The consideration of non-use values is optional for many trus-
tees.90 Those trustees that are not bound by the odd strictures of the 
DOI regulations should seriously consider calculating lost non-use 
values in each case they handle. Although the costs of calculating 
damages may sometimes outweigh the beneªts of collecting such 
damages, in cases where calculation of the lost non-use values is war-
ranted, the imposition of liability for such losses can have several dif-
ferent levels of utility.91 Situations in which it is especially worthwhile 
                                                                                                                      
humans fail to recognize it). “Does wildlife, for example, have no value beyond that to 
humans, or is wildlife worthwhile—even sacred—on its own terms?” Cross, supra note 17, 
at 290. An obligation to pay such damages is not unforeseeable considering that the goals 
of CERCLA are deterrence and complete restoration. One criticism could be that, at some 
point, it is wasteful to make people pay for restoration or for the interests of other living 
things when use is much lower. But DOI would be free to develop a limitation to prevent 
“grossly disproportionate” assessments of non-use values as compared to use values. See V. 
Scott Bailey, Note, Changes in Natural Resources Damage Assessment Procedures: The Department 
of Interior’s Response to Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, 1 Envtl. Law. 
315, 319 (1994) (“The court gave DOI latitude to create exceptions to the restoration cost 
preference if restoration is infeasible or if restoration costs are grossly disproportionate to 
use value.”); see also 132 Cong. Rec. 29,767 (1986) (“Where, of course, restoration is tech-
nically impossible or the costs thereof are grossly disproportionate to the value of the re-
sources to society as a whole, then other valuation measures, both market and nonmarket, 
must be used.”). 
88 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444–45 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“It 
would be odd indeed for a Congress so insistent that all damages be spent on restoration 
to allow a ‘lesser’ measure of damages than the cost of restoration . . . .”). 
89 See generally Bisulca, supra note 2 (noting the cultural, physical, and spiritual rela-
tionship of Penobscot Nation to the Penobscot River and the disrespect shown to them in 
the polluting of the river). 
90 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2004); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
91 See Note, supra note 82, at 1993 (“CV should be used only if the costs of excluding 
nonuse values outweigh the costs generated by CV itself.”). 
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to consider non-use values include those where: the likelihood of liti-
gation remains low;92 some market indicator of non-use value is avail-
able;93 a previously completed contingent valuation study related to a 
similar resource already exists; 94  or the resource is unique, well-
known, or has suffered long-term or irreversible damage.95
 Trustees should err in favor of calculating non-use values because, 
as Congress recognized when it passed CERCLA, humans—through 
ignorance or indifference—often fail to acknowledge much of nature’s 
intrinsic value.96 These damages, in addition to paying for restoration 
and creating other beneªts discussed below, would help advance CER-
CLA’s primary goals of deterrence and environmental protection. 97  
                                                                                                                      
92 Trustees must assess the increased probability that adding non-use values may sub-
vert the out-of-court process, thereby imposing “obstacles to the achievement of an impor-
tant goal of CERCLA—the preference that recovery of natural resource damages be 
achieved through settlement rather than by a court.” Thompson, supra note 83, at 85–86. 
“Settlement discussions may [also] be hindered by uncertainty about the amount of non-
use value damages trustees will seek.” Id. at 86. That said, few CERCLA cases go to trial. See 
Ofªce of Envtl. Guidance, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Integrating Natural Resource 
Damage Assessment and Environmental Restoration Activities at DOE Facilities 
11 (Oct. 1993) (“The rebuttable presumption is, however, primarily of importance in the 
event of litigation. Few natural resource damages cases have, in fact, actually been tried, 
with most being settled out of court.” (endnote omitted)), available at http://www.eh.doe. 
gov/oepa/guidance/CERCLA/nrda3.pdf. 
93 See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 475; see also supra text accompanying note 78. 
94 Such parallel studies may be needed if the trustees lack the funds necessary to de-
velop their own CV studies. 
95 Note, supra note 82, at 1995 & n.95; see also John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsid-
ered, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 778–80 (1967). See generally A. Myrick Freeman III, Nonuse 
Values in Natural Resource Damage Assessment, in Valuing Natural Assets: The Economics 
of Natural Resource Damage Assessment 264, 299–300 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry 
Smith eds., 1993). 
96 Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 457. 
97 Restoration might include any non-use or intrinsic values, and CERCLA may envi-
sion a broader construction of restoration in natural resource damage assessments. After 
all, a primary goal of CERCLA was to make whole the natural resources that suffer injury. 
As a result, restoration, and its costs, may be justiªed even when restoration costs outrun 
willingness to pay. This suggestion is not so outrageous if one remembers that CERCLA is a 
statute designed to deter future release of hazardous pollutants into the environment. If 
restoration costs must be paid, even if extremely high, this can further the goals of deter-
rence and environmental protection. After all, restoration is the proper basic valuation 
measure. See id. at 446. In support of using restoration as the sole remedy for publicly-
owned natural resources, see, for example, Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as the Economi-
cally Efªcient Remedy for Damage to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 430 
(1991) (advocating restoration as the only efªcient remedy that will compensate the public 
fully for its loss). See also Frank B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 
24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 319, 321 (1993) (arguing that restoration provides optimal preserva-
tion as a low cost “selective process that uses the power of natural forces to recreate a bet-
ter functioning ecosystem”). 
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Assessment of damages for non-use values is unlikely to lead to “exces-
sive precautions” on the part of economic players and potential pollut-
ers.98 CERCLA liability is so disastrous for polluters that ªrms and indi-
viduals already engage in economically inefªcient behaviors in order to 
avoid such liability. An additional calculation in conducting NRDAs is 
unlikely to cause a marked increase in economically inefªcient behav-
iors. To the contrary, inclusion of non-use values in NRDAs will facili-
tate economically efªcient activity in the restoration and replacement 
of lost natural resources because the necessary restoration funds will be 
available.99
Conclusion 
 No argument can be made that it is easy to calculate non-use values. 
But many trustees have wide discretion in deciding both whether to fol-
low the DOI regulations and whether to consider non-use values in dam-
age determinations. As the vignette of the Penobscot River illustrates, the 
injury caused by pollution is multifaceted. Where warranted, there are 
multiple beneªts to charging polluters for damages beyond the simple 
repair of the physical problem they caused. The inclusion of non-use val-
ues would help promote accountability and deterrence, and ensure that 
the human interests negatively affected by pollution are adequately ad-
dressed. 
                                                                                                                      
98 But see Note, supra note 82, at 1990–91 (citing Richard A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 176 (3d ed. 1986)). 
99 See Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 445 (stating that DOI’s regulations were not in line with 
Congress’s intention for recovery to be sufªcient to cover the costs of restoration). 
